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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
LLOYD E. LISH, JR.,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, a Maine Corporation,

Case No.
12474

Defendant-Appe 1lant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This was an action for personal injuries received
by plaintiff allegedly sustained when he brought a
metal pole he was holding in his hands in contact with
defendant's power line.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried before the Honorable Calvin
Gould sitting with a jury. From a verdict and judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks a reversal of the judgment and
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judgment in its favor as a matter of l:wv, or that fail
ing, a new trial.
FACTS
On the morning of February 28, 1969, plaintift
\Vent to a grain bin owned by \ Villard R. Smith, Jr.
(Tr. 262) . Plaintiff went to the bin to obtain ()'rail
samples in connection with his occupation as a grair
buyer and trucker (Tr. 93). The grain bin was loeatt
in Holbrook, Idaho, which is very sparsely populateil
farming village with few buildings (Tr. 246). Tl1
temperature on the date in question was very cold (Tr
96).
1

~

After arriving at the bin plaintiff parked his pid
up truck just off the highway approximately undt·
defendant's power lines (Tr. 96). He then got outo1
his truck and took four (Tr. 212, 236) three foot (T'
57) sections of a probe rod out of a gunny sack (Tr
97). The gunny sack contained twelve three foot st
tions (Tr. 97). Plaintiff then proceeded to climb upH
side of the bin and into the bin.Once inside he assembk
the four sections of probe and then attached an et
probe section, which was approximately fifteen incite
in length, to the rod and proceeded to take grain sampl
(Tr. 98). Upon completion of collecting grain samplr·
plaintiff decided not to disassemble the probe rod k
cause he was planning to use the rod at another'.
located nearby (Tr. 99, 100). Plaintiff then proceei:c
to climb back up out of the bin. \Vhen he reached 11
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top, he put one leg over the edge of the bin while leaving the other in the bin (Tr. 100). He then J_: u!led the
approximately thirteen foot metal rod out of the bin.
In pulling the assembled rod from the bin plaintiff
brought the probe in contact with defendant's power
line and received injuries as a result of touching the
line ( Tr. 100) .

Plaintiff was familiar with the bin and the road
upon which the line was located and, in fact, had purchased grain from "\\7 illard Smith on previous occasions (Tr.
172). He had traveled the road on which the bin was
located on many occasions and was aware of the utility
poles (Tr. 176) along the side of the road and of the
power lines on the poles ( Tr.188). There was also un' disputed evidence that the lines themselves were bright
(Tr. 277), and plaintiff testified that he hail twenty!
twenty vision at the time of the accident (Tr. 188).
1 Plaintiff indicated that he was aware of the danger
involved in touching power lines (Tr. 187, 193). Notwithstanding these factors plaintiff did not pay partic, ular attention to the utility poles before climbing up the
sideofthebin (Tr.176).

The probe rod used by plaintiff was over thirteen
feet long (Tr. 236, 57) and could have been increased
r to a length of forty (Tr. 175) or fifty feet (Tr. 57) ·
The probe rod could have been easily disassembled before plaintiff left the bin, but it was not disassembled
for plaintiff's convenience (Tr. 99). As a matter of fact

Galen Christensen who was plaintiff's partner in tk
grain business testified that he told his employees to
dismantle the probe on top of grain bins if they could
(Tr. 66).
The evidence indicated that the nearest charged
wire to the bin was at least 9.01 feet (Tr. 10) away
and was likely more than 9.77 feet (Tr. 285) from the
bin on the day of the accident since it was extremely
cold day and the wires contract in cold weather (Tr.
286). The wires were 28 feet from the ground (Tr.
286) and each of the three charged wires vrns carrying
7200 volts (Tr. 284, 296).

POINT I
PLAINTIFF WAS GUILTY OF CONTRIUTORY NEGLIGENCE AS A
MATTER OF LA'"r.
This Court has clearly established that where a
plaintiff is guilty of contributory negligence he may
not recover from defendant. Defendant contends that
under the facts established at trial, plaintiff negligently
contributed to his own injuries and is therefore barred
from recovery from defendant.
The evidence established that plaintiff was familiar
with the area, the utility poles and the power lines. In
fact, plaintiff admits at Tr. 188 that a person wou~d
have to be blind not to see the power lines. After completing his work in the bin plaintiff pulled his 13 foot
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probe out of the bin without watching where it was
going and negligently allowed it to come in contact
with the power line.
Plaintiff could have easily avoided this accident
by either disassembling the probe before leaving the bin
or by watching where the probe was going as it was
being pulled from the bin.
This Court has previously dealt with the question
of contributory negligence in connection with electrical
equipment. In the case of Koch v. Telluride Power Co.,
116 Utah 237, 209 P.2d 241 ( 1949), this Court held that
contributory negligence may bar recovery against an
electric company for personal injuries caused by electrical equipment.
This Court has also been explicit in denying recoYery in other situations where plaintiffs have been
guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law.
In the case of Johnson v. Syme, 6 Utah 2d 319,
313 P .2d 468 ( 1957), plaintiff was held guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. The plaintiff,
while driving on a four-lane highway, collided with a
car which, with headlights burning, was driving onto
the highway from an intersecting road without stopping
for a stop sign. The plaintiff admitted that she did
not see the defendant's car until it was directly in front
of her at a distance of twenty to thirty feet. This Court
stated that:
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Under such circumstances we cannot but conclude that plaintiff either looked and failed to
see the obvious or failed to look at all and as a
matter of law negligently contributed to her
own in.juries and the death of another motorist. In other circumstances of negligent failure
to look or to see that which is there to be seen,
where the facts were no stronger than those
here, we have concluded, as we do here, that
there was contributory negligence as a matter
of law which precluded recovery. (Emphasis
added) Johnson at 469.
In Richards v. Anderso11, 9 Utah 2d 17, 337 P.2rl
59 ( 1959), the trial court granted summary judgment

against the plaintiff on the grounds that he was contrihutory negligent as a matter of law. The plaintiff was
traveling on Highway U.S. 40 when the defendant
entered the intersection in front of him. This Court stated that:
It is a well settled rule that one may not be
heard to say that he did not see >what was plain
to be seen. He either failed to look or saw and
failed to heed, either of which makes him negligent. (Emphasis added) Richards at 61.

In the case of Whitman v. JV. 'I'. Grant Co., 16
Utah 2d 81, 395 P.2d 918 (1964), the plaintiff was
held guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of
law. The plaintiff, a truck driver, while making a delivery opened a door and stepped off backward into an
elevator shaft without looking. This Court affirming
the trial court stated that:
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The plaintiff is confronted with the basic
proposition that when there is a hazard ''"hieh
is plainly visible, ordinarily one is charged
with the duty of seeing and avoiding it and if
he fails to do so, it is concluded that he is negligent either in failing to look, or in failing to
heed what he saw. TiJThit111an at 920.

* * *

He (the plaintiff) appears to have violated
the sound and often echoed dictum which
arises out of experience and common sense to
"watch where you are going" when no excuse
was shown for his failure to do so. (Emphasis
added) Whitman at 920-921.
In the case of Mc.Allister v. Bybee, 19 Utah 2d

40, 42.5 P.2d 778 ( 1967), the plaintiff alighted from

her car along the curb of a Kanab City street and was
injured when she fell over something in the unpaved,
ireedy area between the curb and sidewalk. She initially
said she did not know what caused her to stumble and
fall. Finally, however, she attributed the accident to a
cement anchor used many years before to hold up a
pole supporting a canopy in connection with a seni
station, which, with the pole, had been removed many
)'ears before. Mrs. l\JcAllister had known of the cement
anchor which was about six or eight inches above the
ground, and had seen it there for many years. In ruling
that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent as a
niatter of law, this Court stated:
... Even had there been no speculation as to

8

whether she tripped over the cement obstruction, she had known of its existence for many
years, that it was in plain sight on a clear
day-and there to see if anyone but looked.
This court consistently has said that under such
circumshmces there ~ould be a defense on the
ground of contributory negligence . . . . 31cAllister at 779.
In the case of Eisner 'l'. Salt Lake City, 120 Utah
675, 238 P.2d 416 (1951), plaintiff was walking along
a dry sidewalk on a clear day and was aware of and had
an unobstructed view of a hole in the sidewalk in front
of her. Just as she approached the hole her attention
was distracted by a large group of children and as a
consequence she stepped into the hole and fell breaking
her wrist. The court held that the plaintiff was guilty
of contributory negligence as a matter of law because
even though her attention was distracted, she knew of
the danger and her behavior fell short of the standards
attributable to the reasonably prudent man.
Other jurisdictions that have dealt with the question
of contributory negligence as a matter of law in cases
involving power lines have denied recovery in fact situations similar to the one presented here by plaintiff.
In the case of Hale v. 3'lontana-Dakota Utililics
Co., 192 F.2d 27 4 (8th Cir., 1951), plaintiff was
acting as a rodman with a surveying crew. He was
using a surveying rod which was constructed in sections.
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When the rod was fully extended it was fifteen feet
in length, but it could easily be collapsed to a length
of five or six feet. In attempting to set the rod in a
vertical position he touched defendant's power line and
was seriously injured. In holding that plaintiff was
guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law,
the court made the following observations:
But we think there is another conclusive reason
why the court did not err in directing a verdict for the defendant. According to his own
testimony plaintiff was well aware of the presence of these overhanging wires. He knew
that they were conductors of electricity, carrying high voltage. He was a mature and intelligent young man and knew the dangerous nature of electricity, and one with knowledge of
the nature and characteristics of electricity and
the danger arising from contact with its conductors is charged with the same degree of
care as is the company producing and transmitting it and failure to exercise such care by
a plaintiff seeking to recover constitutes contributory negligence on his part. * * *
Knowing the presence of these lines and the
danger arising from contcat with them, ordinary care required either that he shorten the
rod to five or six feet or place it to one side
of the lines. There 'tms no necessity of bringing it directly under these lines and the failure
to take any precaution whatever constituted
negligence as a matter of law, and we think
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reasonable men could not differ in this conclusion.

* * *

In affirming a directed verdict for the defendant the court said [82 P.2d 968]: Plaintiff
was in no danger at all until he raised the rod
to the height of the wires. He knew the wires
were somewhere above him. He did not ascertain their exact location. He did not know if
the wires were insulated. He could have determined this fact by simply looking at them. He
did not look at what was in plain sight. This
unfortunate young man simply 'took a chance'
and was terribly injjured." (Emphasis added)
Hale at 28.
In Hamilton v. So1tthern Nevada Power Co., 273
P.2d 760 (Nev., 1954), plaintiff was held guilty of
contributory negligence when he touched a power line
that was in plain view six to eight feet above his head
with an iron pipe he was raising from a well. Plaintiff
and his father both knew the wires were there but they
paid little attention to them.
In the case of Southern IJiaryland Electric Cooperative v. Blanchard, 212 A.2d 801 (l\1d., 1965).
plaintiff was held to have been contributorily negligenl
in bringing a television antenna he was installing in
contact with electrical wires. Plaintiff claimed that lie
did not know the wires were there, but the court held
that he was chargeable with knowing they ·were ther
in view of the fact that he had lived there
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for one month and was working directly under the wires
~t

the time of the accident.

For other cases in which courts have held plaintiffs
guilty of contributory negligence for touching power
lines see Smith v. Virginia Electric and Power Company, 129 S.E. 2d 655 (Va., 1963); Dresser v. Southern
California Edison Co., 82 P.2d 965 (Cal., 1938); and
May v. Illinois Power Co., 96 N.E.2d 631 (Ill., 1951).
A section from C.J.S. also states the standards for
finding contributory negligence when one is injured by
a power line :
One who has notice of the dangerous condition
of a wire or other electrical appliance and
voluntarily or recklessly brings himself into
contact with it, as by touching it with conductors of electricity, is guilty of negligence, and
cannot hold the company for the resulting
injuries, and this is true of any adult, although
he is wholly unskilled in the handling of electricity. To ~ive rise to this defense, however,
it must be shown that plaintiff in coming into
contact with the appliances voluntarily and unnecessarily or negligently exposed himself to
danger.
To constitute want of due care on his part it is
not required that he should have anticipated
the exa.'ct risk which occurred or that the peril
was a deadly one, it is sufficient that he placed
himself in a position of known danger where
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there was no need for him to be or that he
knew or should have known that substantial
injury was likely to result from his acts. 29
C.J.S., Electricity, Sec. 53 ( 1965).
Because plaintiff negligently and carelessly allowed
his probe to come in contact with the power lines, this
Court should find him guilty of contributory negligence
as a matter of law.
POINT II
JURY INSTRUCTION NU l\1 BER
FOURTEEN WAS ERRONEOUS AND
PREJUDICIAL.
Jury instruction number fourteen was given over
defendant's objection (Tr. 316, 317) and was erroneous
and prejudicial. This instruction was argumentatiYe.
inflamatory, biased in plaintiff's favor and was not a
correct instruction of law.
Jury instruction number fourteen as stated in the
Instructions to the Jury starting on page R. 28 std
that:
1

You are instructed that a high tension transmission wire is one of the most dangerous
things known to man. Not only is the current
deadly, but the danger is hidden away in an
innocent-looking wire ready at all times to kill
or injure anyone who touches it or comes too
near it. For the average citizen, there is no way
of knowing whether the wire is harmless or

•

13

lethal until it is too late to do anything about
it. Therefore, a high clegree of c1uty is imposed
upon one who trammits electricity in high tension wires to see that no harm befalls a person
rightfully in proximity thereto when that person is himself guilty of no wrongdoing. In
other words, the highest degree of care must
be used to prevent harm from coming to
others.
Failure to comply with this duty by Utah
Power and Light Company would be negligence.
Defendant contends that this was an improper instruction in that it was not a mere instruction on the
law, but in the context of this trial was an inflamatory
instruction which editorialized and argued the dangers
of high tension transmission wires. The instruction
would also have been confusing to the jury in that at one
point it states that " ... a high degree of duty is upon
one who transmits electricity ... " and in another place
the instruction states ". . . the highest degree of care
must be used ... " If the highest degree of care is required, it implies a strict liability on the part of one
who transmits electricity, and this Court has expressly
held that strict liability does not apply in the case of
electrical transmissions. Brigham v. IJ!oon Lake Electric
Association, 24 Utah 2d 292, 470 P.2d 393 (1970).
The entire instruction was slanted against the defendant and had the effect of depriving the defend-
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ant of a fair trial and was prejudicial in that it
emphasized in several biased ways the nature of transmission wires.
One authority states that it is error to appeal to
the sympathies and prejudices of the jury:
A litigant has a right to a trial by a fair and
and impartial jury, whose consideration of his
cause is not influenced by any language of
the court which would create re<>entment or prejudice against him. Thus, it is error for the
court in its charge improperly to appeal to
the sympathies and prejudices of the jury,
and requested instructinns containing such
appeals are properly refused. However, the
mere fact that a statement of matters, otherwise proper to be taken into account by the
jury, may create sympathy in favor of one
party or the other does not render such statement erroneous. 88 C.J.S., Trial, Sec 343
(1955).

Apparently plaintiff's counsel took the language
of this instruction verbatum from this Court's decision
in the Brigham case, supra. In that case plaintiff, his
father, two brothers and a neighbor boy went searching
for indian arrowheads in an isolated area. Plaintiff and
his fifteen year old brother came upon a grounded wire
which the brother touched with no harm. Plaintiff asked
his brother if they 'vere electric wires and was told that
they were not. In going under the wire, plaintiff reach-
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ed up and touched the charged wire and was severely
injured.
The language contained in Lish's instruction was
taken from an introductory comment made by this
Court prior to stating that Moon Lake Electric Association was not strictly liable. The comment was clearly
dictum and should not have been offered by Lish as a
statement of the law or the holding of the case.
It is also important to note that these two cases are
factually different in that Brigham saw the wire and
deliberately touched it. Also the wire was near the ground
where it could be touched by anyone who walked by.
Defendant contends it was prejudicial error for the
trial court to permit an inflamatory instruction to be
lifted out of context from dictum in a case that was
factually different from the one then at bar.
In the case of Ireland v. Mitchell, 359 P.2d 894
(Ore., 1961), the Oregon Supreme Court stated:
A trial judge is not a mere automaton whose
function is limited to reciting the words approved by statute or by the Supreme Court.
On the contrary, it is not advisable in charging
the jury to use the exact words of an appellate court opinion in stating the law in similar
cases. Mason v. Allen et al., 183 Or. 638, 645.
195 P.2d 717. The judge must preside over
the trial. His office calls for the exercise of
an informed intellect. Ireland at 897.
Defenclant also contends that jury instruction num-
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ber fourteen was erroneous and prejudicial in that it was
argumentative. Not only is the language of this instruction argumentatiYe, but it is also to be noted that plaintiff's counsel prejudicially emphasized this instruction
by reading the entire instruction to the jury both in hi,
closing argument and again in his rebuttal to defendant's
closing argument.
Rule 51 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
states in part:
Argument for the respective parties shall be
made after the court has instructed the jury.
The court shall not comment on the evidence
in the case, and if the court statess any of the
evidence, it must instruct the jury that they
are the exclusive judges of all questions of
fact.
Defendant contends that by giving jury instruction
number fourteen the trial court violated Rule .51 in
that the instruction constituted argument during the
instructing of the jury and that it constituted commenting on the evidence. One authority clearly states that
argumentative instructions are objectionable:
Argument, which lies properly within the domain of counsel in the case, finds no place in
instructions of the court. A court should not
O"ive, and mav
pro1)erlv
refuse, argumentatiYe
0
•
•
instructions. But the giving of such a charge
is not ground for reversal, unless prejudice
to the party complaining results.
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A charge is objectionable as being argumentati,·e when it direct<> the jury to look to or consider certain facts as tending tmrnrd certain
conclu5ions, or when it suggests to the jury
the probable or possible effect of the conduct
of one person toward another. 53 Am. J ur.,
Trial, Sec 552 ( 1945).
In the case of State v. BrM.c:n, 39 Utah 140, ll.5 P.
994 ( 19ll), this Court held that an instruction that is
argumentative is properly refused. The defendant had
been charged with passing a forged instrument, and at
trial several instructions relating to defendant's character were refused. In a concurrmg opm10n. Chief
Justice Frick stated that:
... The italicized portion of the charge which
was refused by the court, while it, in legal
effect, embodies the principle of law I have
outlined above, also contained matter which,
in my judgment, was improper if not vicious.
Much of what is sai<l in that portion of the
charge is mere argument and does not state a
proper legal principle. Broton at 1002.
The Brown court also stated another principle of
the law that is relenmt to the arguments found in this
Point as well as Point III and Point IV, infra.
The general rule, of course, is that every error
is prima facie an injury to the party against
whom it is made; and that where error is
shown injury is presumed, and that it had an
effect upon the result of the trial, unless the
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record affirmatively shows the contrary, or.
not that probably no harm was done, but that
no harm could have been or was done by the
·
committed error. Brown at 1001.
The case of JJfilford Canning Company v. Central
Illinois Public Service Company, 188 N.E.2d 397 (Ill.,
1963), also dealt with an argumentative instruction.
Plaintiff's claim was based on damages suffered from
an interruption of electrical service. During the trial
the court refused an instruction submitted by defendant
because the court ruled it was argumentative. In sus·
taining the trial court, the appellate court said:
Complaint is made that the court erred in refusing defendant's instruction 4, which charged that "defendant was not an insurer or a
guarantor * * * but * * * *." This instruction
is argumentative in that it emphasizes that defendant was not an jnsurer, and minimizes its
duty to exercise ordinary care. 1J11ilford Canning at 400.
Jury instruction number 14 is likewise argument·
ative in that it argues the dangers of power lines and
points out that the danger is hidden until it is too late.
Such language may have been appropriate for plaint·
iff's closing argument but certainly not for an instruct·
ion from the court.
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POINT III
JURY INSTRUCTION NUMBER
THIRTEEN,VASERRONEOUSAND
PREJUDICIAL TO DEFENDANT.
Jury instruction number thirteen was given to the
jury over defendant's objection (Tr. 316). Said instruction states:
You are instructed that fhe State of Idaho has
adopted National Bureau of Standards Handbook 81 entitled Safety Rules for the Installation and JYiaintenance of Electric Supply
and Communication Lines regulating the construction and operation of electrical power
lines. You are further instructed that Section
234.C. (b) provides in part as follows:
"GUARDING OF SUPPLY CONDUCTORS. Supply conductors of 300
volts or more shall be properly guarded
by grounded conduit, barriers, or otherwise, under the following conditions: . . .
( 2)

Where such conductors are placed
near enough to windows, verandas,
fire escapes, or other ordinarily accessible places, to be exposed to contract
by persons."

If you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant violated the regulation above which is designed for the safety of
the plaintiff and other persons engaged in
similar activities, such conduct would be negli-
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gence on the part of defendant Utah Power
and Light Company. (Emphasis added)
This instruction was erroneous and prejmli;ial
for two independent reasons. In the first plare, the
trial court refused to include with this instruction the
definition of "guarded". The definition of "guarded"
was read to the jury during the course of the trial (Tr.
307) and was discussed at trial. The definition of "guard·
ed" is an intregal and essential part of said section an,J
it is necessary in order to properly interpret the section.
In other words, the jury was given only a part of the
section. The part of the code which defines "guarded"
and that was not given defines "guarded" as:
Guarded means covered, shielded, fenced, enclosed, or otherwise protected by means of
suitable covers or casings, barrier, rails, or
screens, matter or platfarms, to remove the liability of dangerous contract or approach by
persons or objects to the point of danger (Tr.
307).
The code goes on to indicate that if a wire is insu·
lated but otherwise unprotected, it is not considered as
"guarded" (Tr. 307).
It is defendant's contention that the jury could
not properly interpret this provision without knoking
what "guarded" meant. As it was, they were left to
their own interpretations as to how defendant shoulu
have guarded the power lines in question. They may
well have conceived the duty on the defendant to haYe
been greater than it was.
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Defendant believes that this instruction was in·
complete and in a se1~sc taken out of context thereby
prejudicing defedant.
Defendant secondly contends that this instruction
should not have been given to the jury at all because
the facts of the case had determined that it was not
applicable.

It is first to be noted that according to the applicable code provision, these wires were more than the
required distance from the bin even if, as the plaintiff
contended, the voltage involved were 12,500 volts (Tr.
295, 296). The code provided that if the voltage in
question were 12,500 volts then the wires would ha"'
to be at least eight diagonal feet from the bin. As was
stated in the Facts, supra, these wires were at least 9.01
feet from the bin.
It should also be noted that part ( 1) of this section
requires "guarding" when the wires cannot be remon•:
from buildings by the distances required by the code. It
therefore would appear that this section requires "guarding" when wires cannot for any reason be kept out of
the reach of persons when they are in "ordinarily accessible p1aces". Plaintiff could not have touched the wi1
with his person and was therefore in no danger until
he began waving a thirteen foot metal rod arounrl t 1
lop of the bin. Since this probe could have been extendl'd to at least forty feet and since the ground under
1
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the wires is certainly an "ordinaril7 accessible p1ace".
the instruction might imply that defendant had a duty
to guard the wires all the wa~r through Holbrook, Idaho.
since they could be reached from the ground. It is to
be remembered in this regard that Holbrook was a small
sparsley populated village with few buildings.
"\Vhen it is kept in mind that these wires could not
have been properly "guarded" by insulating them, the
inapplicability of this section becomes more apparent.
Defendant would have been required to encase all of
these wires or build some suspended structure arournl
these wires to comply with this section. This is not a
reasonable interpretation of the section.
Even if the section and facts are viewed in a light
most favorable to plaintiff, the applicability of thi5
code section to these facts should have been a question
for the jury. However, because the instruction state1
that " ... which is designed for the safety of the plaintiff . . . ", the jury could conclude that the court had
ruled as a matter of law that the section was binding on
defendant and that a violation was negligence (see Point
IV). Such an impression on the part of the jury "·mild
certainly be prejudicial to defendant.

POINT IV
JURY INSTRUCTION NU MR ER
SEYENTEEN "\VAS ERRONEOUS
AND PREJUDICIAL TO DEFENDANT.
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Jury instruction number seventeen was given to
the jury over defendant's objection (Tr. 317). Said
instruction stated:
llefore you can return a verdict in favor of the
plaintiff, you must find by a preponderance
of the evidence that each of the following two
propositions arc true:

PROPOSITION NO. 1:
That the defendant was negligent in one or
more of the following particulars:
A. In failing to comply with the National
Bureau of Standards Handbook No. 81 relating to guarding of supply conductors; or
B. Failing to warn the public of a hazardous condition.
PROPOSITION NO. 2:
That the said negligence of the defendant, if
any, was the proximate cause of the injury.

If you find that the two foregoing propositions are true, you should then consider the
issue of contributory negligence as later defined in these instructions.
The thrust of this instruction was that if the jury
found that defendant was guilty of either A or B under
proposition number one and either was the proximate
cause of plaintiff's injury, defendant was to be found
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liable barring contributory negligence on the part of
the plaintiff. Defendant conten<ls that hoth A and E
under proposition number one are erroneous instructiorn
and obviously prejudicial to defendant.
Proposition No. IA was erroneous for the reasons
set forth in Point III, supra.
Jury instruction number seventeen is further erroneous and prejudicial in that proposition No. Ill
instructed the jury that defendant had a duty to warn
the public of a hazardous condition. There was no eridence whatever introduced that indicated that the defendant did have a duty or that if such duty was owe<l.
how that duty was to be fulfilled. This instruction was
totally without foundation and is contrary to the law
under these circumstances.
Even if defendant did have a duty to warn, there was
a complete absence of any definition or instruction to the
jury as to what was meant by a duty to warn. That
error was called to the attention of the trial court at
the time the instructions were read to the jury, but before the instructions were given to the jury and before
they retired to the jury room. This was called to th1
court's attention by means of a handwritten instruction
prepared by defendant (R.20) which stated that:
There is no duty to warn of an obvious danger
or that which is readily apparent to the ordinary prudent person.
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This instruction was refused so that the jury was
left without any instructions as to what constituted a
duty to warn or under what circumstances the duty arose
or failed to arise.
Defendant first contends that there is no duty to
warn where there is an obvious danger. The dangers of
coming into contact with high powered lines are so
obvious that no warning of those dangers need be given.
Plaintiff himself stated that he knew of the dangers of
coming into contact with power lines and that he knew
he would be injured if he did so. In this case there was
no need to warn the plaintiff because he was already
aware of the facts that any warning would have contained.
Defendant secondly contends that the law imposes
no such duty to warn under these circumstances. In the
case of Berry v. Atlantic Coastline Railroad Company,
273 F.2d 572 (4th Cir., 1960), the decedent was electrocuted while assisting in the unloading of steel from a
railroad car when the crane being used for such unloading came in contact with the defendant's power line.
The court held that even if the defendant had been
negligent in the placement of its power lines, still there
would have been no duty to warn since the decedent was
already aware of the existence, location and the dangers
of the power line. Therefore, the court concluded warning signs could have accomplished only that which the
crane operator already knew-that contact with the line
should be avoided.
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In the case of Lewis v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co.,
212 P .2d 243 (Cal., 1950), the court held that knowledge that a sewer line was being laid along a street
beneath an overhead electric line imposed no duty on
the electric company to warn of the high voltage line
so as to render the company liable for the death of a
workman electrocuted when a crane moving sewer pipe
came in contact with the line. The court said that there
is no duty to warn if from all of the circumstances it
could not have been reasonably anticipated that an acei·
dent of the general nature of that which killed the
plaintiff would have occurred. It is to be remembered
in this regard that the power line with which Lish came
in contact was twenty-eight feet off the ground and a\
least nine feet from the grain bin. It was only when
plaintiff negligently brought the long metal pole in
contact with the wire that the accident occurred. This is
not the kind of happening which an electric company
is bound to foresee and guard against. Had the grain
bin been full, the plaintiff would have had a much
longer probe rod and would have still come in contact
with an electric wire had it been even a greater distance
from the bin. This accident occurred because of the neg·
ligence of the plaintiff and was not one which the de·
fendant could have anticipated.
CONCLUSION
Defendant respectfully submits that the trial court
erred in failing to grant defendant's motion (Tr. 205)
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for an involuntary non-suit on the ground that plaintiff
was contributorily negligent as a matter of law. The
trial court also committed prejudicial error in giving
jury instructions 13, 14 and 17 and in refusing to give
instructions regarding the duty to warn, the lack of
necessity to give a warning concerning that which is
obvious, and defining "guarding". If this Court does
not grant defendant's motion for an involuntary nonsuit, it should grant a new trial.
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